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Frequent flier programs (FFPs) are said to affect airline customer behaviour such that revenue of 
sponsoring airlines increases. To this end prior research relies on assumptions of competition, 
lock-in effects and variations in scale and scope of FFPs. Whether a FFP by itself induces a price 
premium remains unanswered. In an effort to shine some light on this question, we apply discrete 
choice analysis to a new proprietary data set of actual frequent flier member flight behaviour 
(fares paid, FFP points received) over a 12-months period. We take advantage of the variations in 
the structure of FFPs (Gold, Silver and Bronze tier levels), to assess both the existence of a FFP 
price premium and the price premiums average monetary value in US$ per FFP member. Our 
findings suggest that FFP members are willing to pay a price premium of up to six percent, which 
is directly attributable to the FFP.  
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Frequent Flier Programs (FFP) have been part of the global airline industry for three decades 
and  their  basic  premise  of  rewarding  repeat  airline  patronage  has  remained  virtually 
unchanged over time. Although initially derided as short-lived marketing gimmicks, FFPs 
matured from a narrowly targeted marketing device into an essential part of most airlines‟ 
product  offering.  Currently  200  such  programs  exist,  with  all  major  carriers  and  a  large 
number of low cost carriers offering some form of FFP.
1 This development begs the question 
why FFPs have become so immensely popular in a notoriously cash ti ght industry, such as 
the global airline industry. Anecdotal evidence
2  suggests that FFPs engender behavioural 
changes by giving airline customers incentives to consolidate air travel with one sponsoring 
airline, to buy more flights from that airline and to buy more expensive airfares.  
 
Prior  research  has  found  some  evidence  that  FFPs  may  lead  to  entry -deterrence  (see 
Borenstein  1989  and  1996),  switching  costs  (see  Klemperer  1987a  and  1987b),  flight 
consolidation at hub airports (see Lederman 2007 and 2008) and a higher willingness-to-pay 
for air fares (see Morrison et al. 1989, Morrison and Winston 1995 and Nako 1992). These 
insights  were  unanimously  derived  using  the  choice  between  competing  airlines  and 
structural variations within the FFP, such as increases in scale and scope of FFPs, as the main 
drivers of the above mentioned effects. Whether a FFP is intrinsically sufficient to impact the 
conditional choice of fare type leading to an increase in revenue per FFP member has not yet 
been borne out by the evidence. Data limitations to date have made it impossible to estimate 
this particular impact of a FFP on the air fare choices of FFP members. The puzzling question 





Our  conditionally  negotiated  access  to  the  FFP  database  of  a  major  airline  allows  us  to 
answer this question. None of the previous work in this field has had access to actual FFP 
data from an airline. This is, to our knowledge, the first time that an airline has allowed their 
FFP data to be used externally for research purposes making this study unique. Our data 
allows us to exploit variations within the structure of a FFP itself to determine how FFP 
members of an established airline (whose identity must remain undisclosed and hence is 
hereafter  called  airline  X)  choose  between  different  fare  types.  The  findings  presented 
indicate that airline X‟s FFP positively impacts the probability that a member chooses a more 
expensive  fare  when  faced  with  a  menu  of  five  increasingly  expensive  fare  types.  Our 
findings suggest that airline X‟s FFP members are willing to pay a price premium of up to 6 
percent per trip and between 2 and 4 cents (American Dollars, 2008) per FFP point awarded 
to the traveller. Seen in the light of the broader research on FFPs impact on competition in the 
airline industry our findings provide additional evidence that a FFP effect exists. We show 
that this effect is measurable and positive. Our results hold without assumptions about market 
conditions and external variations, but merely due to variations in the structure of the FFP 
itself. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section provides a background 
discussion of FFPs and literature. In section 3 we introduce our empirical framework and 
section  4  describes  the  data.  Section  5  presents  our  estimation  results,  which  we  use  in 
section 6 to determine the fare premium and willingness-to-pay for a FFP point. We conclude 
with a general discussion of our findings in section 7. 
 
 




The structure of FFPs has a seemingly unrelated precursor in the Sperry & Hutchinson (S&H) 
Green Stamps Company, a manufacturer of „loyalty‟ stamps and pasting booklets in the late 
19th century. S&H Green stamps rapidly gained popularity as consumer retention strategies 
adopted by grocery stores, which give the stamps to shoppers as purchase rewards (Schuman 
1986). Shoppers collected the stamps in pasting booklets and once a set number of stamps 
had been reached, the filled booklets could be exchanged against white goods. Shopping at 
non-affiliated stores meant forgoing stamp collection and hence pushing award collection 
into a more distant future. By the 1960‟s however the S&H loyalty scheme had largely run its 
course and for the next two decades loyalty schemes were at fringes of consumer retention 
strategies. The deregulation of the domestic aviation industry in the US in 1978 and the 
simultaneous  advent  of  mass  computerisation  and  data  storage  facilities  gave  rise  to  a 
resurrection of this century old scheme. Physical stamps and pasting books became digital 
savings accounts and loyalty cards. The first, as such recognisable, FFP was AAdvantage 
introduced  by  American  Airlines  in  1981,  which  was  quickly  copied  by  all  major  US 
carriers.
3 Within a few years the FFP phenomenon crossed the Atlantic to Europe. British 
Airways was the first European car rier to introduce a program in direct response to their 
American competitors. The technology boom of the 1990‟s finally allowed for an exponential 
expansion of loyalty programs across a wide range consumer markets globally. At present 
more than 120 million people are enrolled in one or more of the 200 FFPs globally. The 
acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Delta in 2008 created what is currently the largest FFP 
in the world with 74 million members. 
 
Basic  mechanism  -  The  underlying  mechanics  and  structures  of  all  FFPs  have  remained 
largely  unchanged  over  time.  The  airline  traveller  enters  into  a  contractual  membership 5 
 
 
agreement with the airline, in which the airline awards the member a pre-determined number 
of award tokens (e.g. miles, points, etc) per paid and taken flight. The member accumulates 
these tokens and once a pre-determined threshold number is reached these award tokens can 
be redeemed against “free” flights or other goods and services. Up to this point FFPs are very 
similar  to  bulk  discounts  (second  degree  price  discrimination).  However  over  time  the 
majority of  airlines have introduced two different  types of  award tokens:  „Standard‟ and 
„Status‟ points/miles (for reasons of ease we will use „point‟ from hereon in), which airlines 
strongly distinguish from each other (e.g different accounting systems). The standard point 
can be earned through both flying and non-flight transactions, for example the use of an 
affiliated credit card (e.g. Miles and More Visa). The number of standard points earned per 
transaction  will  often  depend  in  a  linear  fashion  on  the  monetary  amount  spent  in  the 
transaction. It is the standard points that are form the „loyalty currency‟ used by members to 
to redeem against goods and service, e.g. the famous free flight or upgrade. What sets most 
FFPs apart from simple bulk discounting is however that members are also often credited 
„Status Points‟ on top of standard points. Status points are exclusively earned through actual 
flying on the sponsoring airline and the amount of status points earned often depends on a 
combination of distance flown and  air-fare paid. Status  points cannot  be used as  loyalty 
currency.  They  are  flag  posts  to  both  the  airline  and  the  member  that  a  specific  points 
threshold has been reached, which entitles the member to “status” levels within a program 
(e.g Bronze, Silver, Gold). Traditionally FFPs have a hierarchical pyramid structure with 
three increasingly elite status tier levels (see Figure 1). The percentage of FFP members in 
each  level  depends  on  the  ease  of  earning  status  points,  a  variable  which  is  controlled 
exclusively by the sponsoring airline. In general the percentages of FFP members across 




Insert Figure 1 about here 
As  outlined  above,  only  the  accrual  of  status  points  leads  to  a  move  from  one  status 
membership tier level to the next. Importantly, status levels give rise to both an increasing 
number of priority treatments to elite FFP members (e.g tangible perks such as loung access) 
and accelerated (non-linear) standard points accrual. It is this non-linearity in standard points 
accrual that has been recognised as leading to anti-competitive effects of FFPs. Klemperer 
(1987) for example shows that the non-linear standard points accrual introduces and increases 
switching costs to members at an increasing rate the higher that member‟s status within a 
FFP. The stylised process of moving from one elite tier level to the next over a set period of 
time is shown in Figure 2. A clear understanding of this process is necessary because any 
FFP related increase in the willingness-to-pay for air fares should be highest once a FFP 
member is close the next tier level. As shown in Figure 2, both status and standard points are 
earned over time, however the validity period of status points does often not coincide with the 
validity period of standard points. While a member gets automatically upgraded to a higher 
membership tier once the necessary status points are reached it is only at the annual status 
points review date that it is determined whether a member remains in a membership tier or 
gets downgraded.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Once a traveller is  engaged in a FFP, the system of tiers and non-linear standard points 
accrual creates tangible switching costs to the FFP member. Any forgone flights with the 
sponsoring airline results in both forgone standard and status points and ultimately a tangible 




Literature  –  Although  the  marketing  literature  has  long  been  investigating  FFPs
4,  the 
question whether FFPs induce by their mere existence a tangible price premium remains an 
open one. Indeed the few existing theoretical articles treating FFPs as competitive devices 
that may impact airfares in the airline market are in the economic s literature. These articles 
however generally make strong initial assumptions such as the existence of   a  perfectly 
competitive market structure, or at the very least airline duopolies, to explain the advent, 
expansion and attractiveness of FFPs to both ai rlines and travellers  (e.g. Banerjee and 
Summers, 1987; Basso et. al, 2009). The strength of the incentive changing nature of FFPs  
and hence possible price premium is largely explained through the afore mentioned switching 
costs and the associated lock -in  effects  of  the non-linear nature of FFPs points earnings 
schedules. Airline network effects (e.g. where the airline flies to and how many partners they 
have) are seen as enhancing FFPs in both scale and scope. This in turn is  supposed to lead to 
increases in the underlying value of  FFPs to its members (e.g Lederman, 2007). The larger 
the flight network of an airline, the more earning and award possibilities for FFP members 
exist, which makes the FFP more valuable.  Theory suggests that FFPs ultimately either  
negatively affect competition in the airline industry, as they raise barriers to entry, or 
alternatively erode airline profitability because airlines are caught in a prisoners dilemma 
type situation (see Banerjee and Summers 1987 and Basso, Clements, and Ross 2009).  
 
The few existing empirical studies investigating the possible impact of FFPs on customer 
behaviour find that the existence of fare premiums are caused by both competition effects and 
network  effects.  Nevertheless  the  lack  of  data  generally  limits  the  understanding  of  the 
influence that FFPs have on their own on fare type choices and FFP induced fare premiums. 
The first empirical fare type choice study was undertaken by Nason  in 1980, a year before 
the introduction of FFPs. Although FFP membership is not one of the explanatory variables 8 
 
 
in Nason ‟s (1980) empirical framework, it warrants mention, as his approach analysed the 
fare  type  choice  problem  at  the  individual  traveller  level.  The  choices  a  traveller  makes 
before buying a fare type are seen in terms of the trip-planning process and the trip and fare 
type combinations (Nason 1980). 
 
Empirical  studies  can  be  classified  according  to  data  sources  into  revealed  or  stated 
preference studies and applied econometric techniques. Revealed preference studies use data 
on actual transactions, such as actual sales data (e.g. the U.S. Department of Transport (DoT) 
10%  domestic  fare  sample),  whereas  stated  preference  studies  use  data  collected  from 
customer surveys and interviews. All empirical work focuses on the North American airline 
market employing disaggregate data from an array of different US carriers. The commonality 
in their findings suggest that FFPs affect air traveller choices to varying degrees , which 
translates into a range of different values of the resulting FFP induced price premium.  
 
Table 1 presents a synopsis of the empirical literature applicable to our research. We adjusted 
the FFP related price premiums of each study into 2008 US$ levels per single trip to compare 
with our results. Nako (1992), Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995 and 1999) and Hess, 
Adler, and Polak (2007) all investigate the relationship between FFP membership and fare 
premiums. Morrison et al. (1989) and Morrison and Winston (1995) explore the FFP mileage 
times  the  number  of  cities  served  by  a  carrier  as  an  explanation  for  existence  of  a  FFP 
premium. They argue that if more cities are served FFP mileage becomes more valuable. 
However, by combining FFP mileage and cities served into one explanatory variable, the 
separate effect of each factor cannot be disentangled. So, the individual effect of FFP mileage 
remains unclear. In two separate studies,  Lederman (2007 and 2008) uses an increase in 9 
 
 
eligible partner flights and an extension of the dominant airline‟s FFP as the cause for FFP 
induced price premiums. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Morrison et al. (1989) are the first to show, using the U.S. DoT Origin and Destination data 
that FFP membership has a considerable impact on airline choice. They estimate that an 
airline offering FFP mileage could increase the average airfare by US$ 30 for an average 
single trip.  Borenstein  (1989) hints  that  approximately  two percent  point of a given fare 
premium might be attributable to a FFP effect. Building on the findings of Morrison et al. 
(1989), Nako (1992) used disaggregated corporate level data to further quantify the effects of 
FFPs on fare premiums. He found that an airline offering a FFP can increase its average 
airfare by US$ 30. In a follow-up study Morrison and Winston  (1995) show that a traveller‟s 
valuation of additional FFP points is aligned with the airlines‟ FFP point award schedules. 
FFP members, who have accumulated almost enough miles for a free trip, place a higher 
marginal value on additional points (between US$ 17c and US$ 28c per point) than those 
who are further away from the points threshold. The average they find is 12c per point. 
Travellers close to  receiving  a free trip  experience  a stronger lock-in effect and may  be 
willing  to  pay  a  higher  fare  premium  in  return  for  additional  points.  Proussaloglou  and 
Koppelman (1995) found that carrier choice is influenced by FFP membership. FFPs were 
found to better predict carrier choice than schedule convenience, low fares and timeliness. 
They  conclude  that  any  major  changes  to  well-established  FFPs  may  have  serious 
implications for the airline‟s customer base. In a later study, Proussaloglou and Koppelman 
(1999) estimate three FFP price premium levels for travelling on preferred carriers in whose 
program  a  member  most  actively  accumulates  points.  Their  results  suggest  that  business 10 
 
 
travellers are willing to pay an average premium of US$ 39 to travel with a carrier in whose 
program they participate if they are low-frequency travellers whereas they would pay US$ 54 
premium if they are high frequency travellers. 
 
Most  recently  Hess,  Adler,  and  Polak  (2007)  used  stated  preference  data  from  a  survey 
undertaken in the San Francisco Bay to estimate the premium on fares where the traveller 
holds FFP-memberships. They found that business travellers are willing to pay a premium of 
US$ 75 to fly on an airline where they hold an elite frequent-flier account. Lederman (2007) 
used  the  publicly  available  10%  domestic  ticket  sample  data  of  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Transport to estimate the FFP induced fare premium of an airline dominant at a hub airport. 
She found that offering FFP points increases the average fare by between 3.5% and 5% and 
the most expensive 80th percentile fare by between 7% and 9%. Using the same data set as in 
Lederman (2007), Lederman (2008) found that the FFP premium per single trip is US$ 8, 
which translates to 3.8% of the average fare.  
 
With the notable exception of Nako (1992) all RP studies base their analysis and results on 
crucial assumptions regarding FFP memberships of travellers. The non-availability of data on 
individual  traveller  memberships  across  airlines  results  in  an  oversimplification  of  the 
assumed FFP membership. For example, Lederman (2008) uses the sponsoring carrier‟s level 
of dominance at the departure airport as a proxy for the probability that a traveller is a FFP 
member with the specific carrier. Another concern is the fact that in the above discussed 
literature the explanatory variables capturing the effect of FFPs are combined with a network 
(hub) effect. This combination makes it impossible to disentangle the two separate effects. To 
address this issue, our work shows that the effect of FFP can be estimated without assuming a 




In summary most prior RP empirical literature relies both on strong assumptions regarding 
FFP membership status of travellers, hub effects, variations in the networks of carriers and 
data gathered across airlines operating within quasi-competitive markets in order to show the 
existence of a FFP fare premium. Although theoretical work has established that the very 
structure of FFPs (i.e. non-linearity of redemption and earning schedules) leads to the lock-in 
effect of FFPs and ultimately to price premiums, the existence of directly FFP induced price 
premiums has not been explored empirically. To address this gap in the literature, our work 
shows that such price premiums do exist and are directly derived from the mere existence of a 




We apply discrete choice modelling to explore the effect of FFP on consumer behaviour and 
to identify FFP induced price premiums. Discrete choice models are standard in the analysis 
of  consumer  behaviour  (e.g.  Morrison  et  al.    1989).  The  implicit  ordering  of  fare  types 
dictates our use of the discrete choice model. Ordered logit models cannot be applied as these 
models cannot take into account alternative specific attributes. For that reason, we apply the 
multinomial logit model as our reference model. We show that the random parameter variant 
of the model is most suitable to control for potential correlation in error terms between the 
different alternatives and between multiple observations per person. 
 
Multinomial logit - We define the basic MNL model as used in prior empirical studies (e.g. 
Nako 1992 and Morrison and Winston 1985). The indirect utility function associated with 
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The utility function includes a systematic component, β‟xnj+γ‟zn, and a stochastic part, the 
error term, εnj.
5 The vector of observed alternative specific variables, including fare and fare 
interaction terms, is given by  xnj whereas zn represents the vector of observed individual 
specific variables. Finally, the vectors β and γ contain the parameters of interest (e.g. fare and 
tier membership parameters). The individual traveller is assumed to be a rational decision 
maker who selects the fare type that maximizes his utility. 
 
Mixed multinomial logit - As the assumption of independent, uncorrelated, error terms, εnj, is 
crucial to the multinomial logit model, we use mixed multinomial logit to test the hypothesis 
that  due  to  the  implied  ordering  of  fare  types  the  error  terms  are  correlated.  Mixed 
multinomial logit modelling relaxes three principal assumptions of the standard logit model. 
First, it allows for unrestricted substitution patterns between all alternatives. Second, random 
taste variation among respondents can be accounted for. Third, mixed logit modelling can 
account for unobserved factors over time. All assumptions play a key role in our analysis and 
are therefore important in determining the effect of FFP programs and the identification of 
FFP price premiums.  By  including an error component structure that creates  correlations 
among the utilities for different alternatives one can account for the ordered structure of the 
responses  without  relying  on  predefined  assumptions  about  the  ordering.  The  error 
component structure version of the model of equation (1) is as follows: 
 
(2) 




The variables are defined as above, with μn representing a vector of random terms with zero 
mean. The terms in δnj are error components that, along with εnj define the stochastic part of 
the utility (Train 2003). Depending on the specification of δnj we can account for correlation 
in the unobserved parts of the utility function among the alternatives. For example if we 
assume that alternatives i and j are correlated in unobserved effects, we include in both utility 
functions the same μijδnij term, where μij has zero mean. Our hypothesis is that the error terms 
of adjacent fare types are correlated, so fare type one is related to two, and three is related to 
two and four. The model can be expanded further with individual specific parameters. In this 
way,  heterogeneity  of  preferences  of  the  frequent  flyer  members  is  tested  and  can  be 
accounted for.  
 
The third important property of the mixed logit model is that it can account for multiple 
observations per FFP member in our data set. Correlation between individual-specific error 
terms over subsequent responses can be incorporated via panel mixed logit. The panel mixed 
logit application of the model as presented in equation (2) is as follows: 
 
(3) 
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The variables are defined as above. The vector of β parameters is adjusted into individual 
specific  parameters.  Hence,  this  utility  function  is  now  specific  for  each  alternative, 
individual and choice situation, t. Since mixed logit probabilities are the integrals of standard 
logit probabilities over a density of parameters, simulation techniques are required to estimate 
the  model.  Therefore,  the  probability  that  person  n  chooses  alternative  j  in  time  period 
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The panel mixed logit formulation as depicted in equations (4) and (5) enables us to test our 
hypothesis  that  correlation  between  error  terms  of  adjacent  alternatives  is  present.  If  the 
estimated variance of the error component is significant, correlation between error terms of 
adjacent alternatives is present i.e. the alternatives are ordered and we cannot use the simple 
MNL model to determine the FFP related fare premium.   
 
DATA 
Data on actual fare type choices are taken from a proprietary dataset. The dataset is provided 
by airline X on a confidential basis, which restricts us from naming either the FFP or our 
airline  partner.
6  Airline  X  is  an  established   carrier  with  an  extensive  domestic  and 
international network. It is engaged in alliances with a number of other large international 
carriers. Airline X‟s FFP has from its inception been growing strongly in member numbers, 
currently approximately two million, and revenues. Airline X‟s FFP is recognized as being 
amongst  the  most  innovative  FFPs  in  the  industry.  The  data  covers  a  5%  representative 
sample of active FFP members of airline X. Active members are defined as customers of 
airline X, who have flown at least once within a given 12 months period. It includes all 
domestic flights active FFP members took during a twelve months period beginning on the 1
st 
of January and ending on the 31
st of December 2008. We restrict our analysis on domestic 
flight activity because research suggests that FFPs will be a more important choice variable 15 
 
 
on domestic flights than international flights, where the two most important choice variables 
for travellers have been  repeatedly  found to  be  flight  schedule and price (e.g Sharp  and 
Sharp, 1997; Toh et.al, 1988). Furthermore, all FFP related activities (earning and redemption 
of points) as well as member characteristics are included in our dataset. Airline X offers five 
different fare types per flight and its FFP program involves three status tier categories e.g. 
Bronze, Silver and Gold. We include only trips for which we can establish an average one-
way  trip  fare  paid  for  each  fare  type.  After  removal  of  incomplete  trip  observations  the 
sample contains 60 782 trips, which is 45% of the original sample. In total 13 148 individual 
FFP members are included in the dataset. On average, each member made 4.6 (standard 
deviation 7.0) trips in 2008. Table 2 summarizes the categorical variables in the dataset, 
whereas the summary statistics for all other variables appear in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Flight variables - We calculate the average fare paid per trip, which is used as a proxy for the 
airfare at the time of booking. This average fare is specific in origin-destination, days booked 
in advance, and departure time.
7 The average fare per fare type  in 2008 US$ is reported in 
Table 3. The fare types are ordered from lowest to highest fare type. The average distance (in 
miles) is increasing in fare type. The variable “Fare conditions” is our proxy for quality. We 
compute a score based on the conditions attached to each fare type, i.e. whether the fare type 
is  transferable,  refundable  and/or  cancellable.  The  restricting  conditions  attached  to  the 
airfare, the higher the quality of the fare. The cheapest fare type is attributed the lowest score, 16 
 
 
1, whereas the two most expensive fare types have the maximum score, 4. This implies that 
quality for fare types 4 and 5 are the same, which is actually the case for airline X‟s menu of 
fares. Since price differences are present between fare type 4 and 5, one difference between 
these fare types  is  the accrual  of FFP (status) points.  Furthermore, we create a variable, 
“Within  10%  of  next  tier  level”,  indicating  whether  the  FFP  member  at  the  moment  of 
purchase is, based on accumulation of status points, within 10% to be qualified for the next 
tier level. In line with Morrison and Winston (1995) we expect an increase in the willingness-
to-pay for FFP mileage if a person is close to the next elite tier level.  
 
Tier variables - The variable “Tier” in Table 2 shows that the vast majority of members are in 
the lowest tier showing that the exclusivity principle of the FFP remains present. Table 2 
shows tier levels at 31
st of December 2008 whereas in the estimation we use tier level at the 
time  of  purchase.  Furthermore,  “FFP  member  other  airline”  highlights  that  half  of  the 
members also participate in the FFP program of the major competing airline. “FFP tier status 
other  airline”  reflects  the  status  level  of  members  in  that  specific  FFP  program.  Prior 
research,  e.g.  Toh  and  Hu  (1988),  states  that  a  large  majority  of  FFP  members  hold 
simultaneous memberships in multiple FFPs, although often one FFP is more actively used. 
The effect of membership in another FFP is difficult to determine a priori. For instance, 
multiple  memberships  may  indicate  that  the  passenger  is  a  frequent  business  traveller 
choosing more often a higher quality fare type. On the other hand, being a member of another 
FFP decreases the incentive to buy more expensive fare types at airline X since the majority 
of the points might be earned and accumulated via travelling with the competing airline. 
 
Socio-economic variables - We include socio-economic characteristics as control variables. 
In particular, gender, job and age are taken into account. Table 2 shows a summary for the 17 
 
 
categorical variables gender and job, whereas Table 3 summarizes the statistics for the age 
variable. 
 
Two more issues warrant attention. First, we do not include FFP points accrual as a flight 
type characteristic. Airline X‟s FFP points accrual is linearly correlated with the average fare 
per fare type. Hence, we cannot include both average fare and FFP points accrual and need to 
exclude  both  standard  and  status  points  awarded  per  trip  as  an  explanatory  variable. 
Secondly,  discrete  choice  modelling  requires  defining  the  relevant  choice  set  for  each 
observation. We assume that at the time of purchase all five fare types are available. This 
implies  that  members  purchasing  expensive  fare  types  do  so  because  it  maximizes  their 
utility. In reality, these people might buy these fare types because cheaper alternatives were 
unavailable at the time. This may imply a bias towards more expensive fare types. To define 
the applicable choice set Suzuki (2007) proposes a two-step procedure. Unfortunately, our 
data is insufficient to follow this approach, e.g. information about capacity restrictions at the 
time of purchase is not available. We include the variable “Days booked in advance” to 




Table 4 presents the results of the estimated panel mixed logit model as described in the 
above sections. We use Biogeme 1.8 to estimate the models (Bierlaire 2003). In the final 
estimation  we  applied  2250  Halton  draws.  In  our  estimation  we  distinguish  between 
alternative  specific  variables  (e.g.  “Fare”)  and  variables  that  do  not  change  over  the 
alternatives  (e.g.  “Days  booked  in  advance”).  For  every  alternative  specific  variable  we 
estimate  one  related  parameter  which  is  valid  for  each  of  the  alternatives.  In  case  the 18 
 
 
variables do not differ over alternatives, we estimate a separate parameter for each of the five 
alternatives. Since only differences in utility are of importance, one of the five parameters is 
normalized in order to identify the model. For all these latter variables, we normalize the 
parameter of the first alternative to zero. The parameters of the remaining four alternatives 
are therefore interpreted as relative effects compared to the first alternative. In addition, each 
dummy variable needs a reference category (e.g. Bronze for tier membership), which we also 
normalize  to  zero,  so  the  parameter  estimates  are  interpreted  relative  to  this  reference 
category. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
As discussed in Section 3 we test the hypothesis that correlation between error terms of 
adjacent  alternatives  is  present.  Our  results  show  that  all  four  specified  variance  error 
components  are  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Hence,  correlation  between  error  terms  of 
adjacent alternatives is present and the simple MNL model assumptions are violated. Another 
concern is the correlation between multiple observations per FFP member. Using results not 
reported  we  conclude  that  the  panel  mixed  logit  model  specification  of  this  model 
outperforms the non-panel mixed logit model. Below we discuss in detail the obtained effects 
of fare, fare conditions and FFP to fare type choice. Note that we cannot assess the magnitude 
of the separate effects directly from Table 4. Given our model specification, i.e. the discrete 
choice model, we can only assess significance levels and signs. The magnitude of the effects 
can be assessed via analysis of marginal effects and/or elasticities of choice probability. Since 
we  use  our  preceding  empirical  results  in  the  next  section  to  derive  the  expected  price 
premium per trip and the implied value of a FFP point, we do not report the marginal effect 




Before discussing the results in detail, we address the issue of the potential omitted variable 
bias in our estimation caused by not including the trip purpose. Since we do not observe the 
trip purpose, we cannot distinguish between business  or leisure trips and cannot indicate 
whether or not the trip is paid for by the employer. One could argue that the trip purpose has 
an effect both on the fare choice and the elite status of a passenger.
8 Therefore, our estimates 
could be biased and inconsistent. The potential omitted variable bias can occur at the trip and 
individual (sequence of trips) level. In general, airlines try to discriminate between business 
and leisure passengers based upon characteristics such as days of booking in advance and the 
origin destination. In order to diminish the potential omitted variable bias, we include these 
type of variables airlines u se themselves.  At the individual level we try to capture the 
difference between general business and leisure passengers by including “Job”, “FFP member 
other  airline”  and  “FFP  tier  status  other  airline”.  One  could  argue  that  the  status  of  the 
individual  within the  FFP  program  of  the  competing  airline  combined  with  the  status  at 
airline X is a good signal for the distinction between business and leisure passengers.  
Finally  as  a  robustness  check  against  this  potential  bias  at  the  individual  level,  we  also 
estimate  the  model  without  the  individuals  who  have  a  Gold  or  Platinum  status  at  the 
competing airline. The results turn out to be robust against this potential omitted variable 
bias. 
 
The effects of fare and fare conditions to fare type choice - The fare parameter is included as 
a random parameter with a normal distribution. We observe that the mean effect of the fare is 
negative and significant. As expected and predicted by economic theory, the probability of 
choosing  a  particular  alternative  declines  if  the  price  of  that  alternative  increases.  By 
specifying individual specific fare parameters we capture the effect of differences amongst 20 
 
 
airline X‟s FFP members in opportunities to spend the awarded FFP mileage. In the literature 
these  opportunities  are  often  attributed  as  network  or  hub  effects  (see  e.g.  Nako  1992, 
Morrison and Winston 1995 and Lederman 2007). The estimated standard deviation of the 
fare parameter is significant and in absolute terms larger compared to the mean effect. This 
indicates that for several FFP members an increase in price results in an increase in the choice 
probability of that particular alternative. Possible explanations are that higher prices signal 
higher quality or that frequent fliers are insensitive to prices but sensitive to the extra accrual 
of FFP points, particularly if opportunities to spend awarded mileage are ample, induced by 
higher prices. We allow for different price effects per FFP status by including the interaction 
effects “Fare*Tier”. Both effects are in absolute terms smaller than the average mean fare 
effect. Compared to Bronze tier members, the average price effect of silver tier members is 
0.0034 smaller whereas the difference in the average price effect between the silver and gold 
members  is  just  0.0001.  Hence,  our  results  show  that  members  in  higher  tiers  are  less 
sensitive to prices. As expected, the mean of the effect of the quality, i.e. “Fare conditions”, 
variable is positive implying that increasing our proxy of quality of an alternative increases 
the probability that the alternative will be chosen.  
 
The effects of FFP to fare type choice - The results with respect to tier membership indicate 
that silver and gold tier members are more willing to buy more expensive tickets compared to 
bronze tier members. All tier membership effects, except the “Silver tier level alt. 5” are 
significant. In particular, the effect of gold tier membership on choosing the most expensive 
fare type seems to be large. Furthermore if tier members are within 10% of moving to the 
next  tier  level,  the  probability  that  these  members  choose  a  more  expensive  fare  type 
increases. This finding is in line with Morrison and Winston  (1995) who argue that travellers 
who have accumulated almost enough points for a reward (i.e. a free trip, an upgrade) place a 21 
 
 
very high value on additional accrual of points. Our results show that being a member of 
another FFP enhances the probability of choosing more expensive fare types. Furthermore, 
the probability of choosing more expensive fare types is increasing in the tier status in the 
competing FFP program. Note that e.g. the total effect of choosing fare type 5 of a FFP 
member of airline X who holds a Gold tier status in the competing FFP program equals 
1.1671  +  2.0286  compared  to  a  FFP  member  of  airline  X  who  is  not  a  member  of  the 
competing FFP program and 2.2086 compared to a FFP member of airline X who holds a 
Bronze  status  at  the  competing  FFP  program.  These  finding  suggest  that  for  the  FFP 
members in our data the effect of being a frequent flier overpowers the incentive to buy less 
expensive fare types. 
 
To summarize, our results show that fare, taking into account differences in quality, and the 
probability  of  choosing  a  particular  alternative  have,  as  expected,  a  positive  relation. 
However, the fare effect differs over individuals and over groups of individuals. Furthermore, 
tier membership plays a significant role in explaining the choices of FFP members. Members 
in higher tier classes are more willing to purchase expensive fare types. In the next section we 
apply our results to calculate the expected revenues derived from FFP members‟ willingness 









We have shown in the preceding sections that the members of airline X‟s FFP are to varying 
degrees  influenced  by  virtue  of  their  FFP  membership  to  buy  more  costly  fare  types.  
Although  this  finding  in  itself  contributes  in  no  small  terms  to  the  empirical  literature 
investigating FFPs it raises two further questions, which prior empirical research has tried to 
address with recourse to competitive effects between carriers. The first question addresses the 
magnitude of the FFP price premium whereas the second question addresses the monetary 
value of one FFP point. In this section we address both questions. What sets our results apart 
from prior empirical results (e.g. Lederman 2008) is that we exploit variations in the structure 
of airline X‟s FFP itself (i.e. status tier levels) to both derive the FFP induced price premiums 
and values of FFP points. We derive the FFP price premiums based on the marginal effect of 
a hypothetical change of tier status (Bronze to Silver and Silver to Gold).
9 Subsequently, we 
calculate the monetary value of a FFP point in airline X‟s FFP. Our findings are not only of 
major relevance to airline X and the FFP structure, but can play a significant role in future 
policy making with respect to regulation of FFPs and possible taxation of FFP benefits to 
FFP members. Below we formulate the price premium in terms of expected revenue per trip 
on airline X and the monetary value of a FFP point. 
 
Expected revenue - We determine the expected revenue to airline X per trip per FFP member, 
which equals the expected price a FFP member is willing to pay for that trip: 
 
(6)  . n nj j j Expected revenue per trip p    
 
where Pnj is the probability that person n chooses alternative j and pj is the average fare for 
alternative j. FFP members buy a composite product; the airfare is due to the structure of 
airline X‟s FFP intrinsically linked to the number of FFP points the member receives. Using 23 
 
 
scenario analysis, we calculate the implicit willingness-to-pay per trip according to FFP tier 
membership. The difference between the expected revenues (price) at status quo (base case) 
and the counterfactual scenario determines the implicit willingness-to-pay.  
 
We look at two scenarios in which we forecast the change in behaviour of airline X‟s tier 
member based on an exogenous change in their elite tier status. As discussed in the previous 
section, the estimation results suggest that a higher tier level increases the expected revenue 
since the probability of buying more expensive fare types increases with tier membership and 
fare  tier  membership  interaction  effects.  Stated  differently,  the  forecasted  revenues  are 
assumed to  be different due to  the marginal effect  of  a change in  tier level.  In the first 
scenario the elite tier status of each Bronze FFP member changes to Silver, while in the 
second scenario the elite tier status of each Silver FFP member changes to Gold all else being 
equal. The implied price and points premium per trip in each scenario is defined as: 
 
(7) 
10 , nj j nj j jj Price Premium p p       
 
(8) 
1 0 0 0 . nj j nj j jj Points Premium p p        
 
where 0 and 1 represent the base case and counterfactual scenario respectively. Furthermore, 
λ represents the points per 2008 US$. All remaining variables are defined as above. The price 
premium reflects the forecasted increase in revenues per trip, whereas the forecasted increase 
in acquired FFP points per trip is reflected by the points premium. By dividing the price 
premium  by  the  points  premium  we  obtain  the  forecasted  implied  value  of  a  FFP  point 
induced due to an exogenous change in tier level. The value of a point is evaluated at the 
(average) price the FFP member would pay in the base scenario. The value of a point at the 24 
 
 
new price can also be derived by multiplying λ
1 by 
1
nj j j p   .  In  the  latter case, both an 
increase in (average) fare and the difference in points awarded per dollar spent determine the 
value of a FFP point. In order to avoid an arbitrarily disentanglement of effects we  evaluate 
the value of a point at (average) prices paid in the base scenario.  
 
Results - The average FFP induced price premium in the first scenario equals US$ 8.67 (std. 
dev. US$ 6.32) per trip or six percent of the average fare paid. In the second scenario, the 
FFP induced price premium equals US$ 8.15 (std. dev. US$ 8.97), or six percent of the 
average fare paid. The average value of a FFP point in the first scenario ranges from US$ 4c 
to US$ 6c (std. dev. US$ 2c) respectively. In the second scenario, the average value of a FFP 
point ranges from US$ 4c to US$ 6c (std. dev. US$ Xc). These results are based on the 
assumption that the extra FFP points earned per dollar spent on a fare type are the only 
benefit a loyal customer derives from a higher tier level. Therefore our reported values of a 
FFP point are the upper limits of the true values. Although these findings are somewhat lower 
compared to reported figures in earlier studies they are consistent. One possible explanation 
for our slightly lower values is that we restricted our data to domestic flights, which by 
definition are shorter and cheaper than international flights.  
 
General Discussion - We show that airline X derives direct and measurable benefits from the 
existence of its FFP. It can hence be argued based upon these results that FFP members are 
willing to pay a higher airfare in order to „buy‟ FFP points. Our findings furthermore suggest 
an explicit monetary value of a FFP point. The implications of such a value for the airline are 
twofold. Firstly, many airlines sell points to other firms (e.g. banks, credit card companies) 
for the exclusive use of these other firm‟s customers. The sale price per point depends on the 
outcome of the negotiation between the airline and the buyer. Anecdotally this value ranges 25 
 
 
between US$ 1.5c and US$ 2c. Our results of US$ 4c to US$ 6c per FFP point can serve 
airline X as a benchmark price when entering into negotiations and when reviewing current 
sales agreements. In fact, airline X should have a range of different prices at which it sells its 
points. In other words, points that the bank or credit card company intends to allocate to its 
highly valued customers should be sold by airline X at a higher price per point than those 
points intended for allocation to low value customers. In theory this price discrimination is 
straightforward.  In practice however points  are  seen as  homogenous  goods.  One point is 
exactly equal to the next point, hence asking different prices for essentially the same good 
appears at first glance difficult to implement. However the sales negotiation for points, which 
are generally sold in large „blocks‟ (e.g. 100,000 points per block), take place between two 
very  informed  parties,  the  airline  and  the  bank/credit  card  company  etc.  There  is  little 
information asymmetry prevalent about the market and customer behaviour. Both the airlines 
and the banks/credit card companies know that different customers value points at different 
prices,  which  in  fact  makes  a  point  not  equal  a  point.  It  will  hence  come  down  to  the 
bargaining power held by either side, whether a menu of prices reflecting different customer 
valuations will be have to be paid by the banks/credit card companies for the FFP points.  
 
Secondly, with the introduction of the international accounting standards IFRIC 13 in 2008 it 
has become mandatory for airlines to estimate the value of the FFP points to customers and to 
defer this amount of revenue as a liability until the FFP member has redeemed their points. 
IFIRC 13 is based on the view that FFP members implicitly pay for the FFP points and hence 
that airlines need to measure the amount that the FFP member has paid for the points. Errors 
in estimation of this liability lead invariably to large profitability issues for airlines.  Our 
research measures what FFP member of airline X have paid for the points on average, hence 
it allows airline X to allocate an appropriate monetary amount as a liability. Furthermore our 26 
 
 
empirical approach to estimate the value of FFP points can be applied to any FFP data of any 
airline and in fact any loyalty program provided that the program has a status membership 
structure in place.  
 
Our research has shown that airline X‟s FFP with its hierarchical three status tier levels has a 
mechanism at its disposition that changes the behaviour of FFP members in favour of airline 
X. FFP members across all tiers are paying tangible price premiums according to their status 
in the FFP. A direct implication of this finding for airline X is that it should raise variation 
within  the  FFP  by  e.g.  increasing  the  number  of  status  tier  levels  to  further  exploit  the 
willingness-to-pay of its FFP members. In fact a number of FFPs, most notably Lufthansa‟s 
Miles and More with its Honors Circle and United Airlines with Platinum Elite have recently 
departed from the traditional three tier pyramid membership structure to a four and even five 
tier structure. However a structural change that introduces a super elite tier over the current 
elite tier is not costless. Irrespective of the potentially large financial costs of undertaking this 
change, it seems that the real trade-off facing airline X is between how many FFP members it 
elevates into a super elite tier and the changes all remaining FFP members in the program 
will experience. It might lead to a loss of engaged FFP members who feel disenfranchised by 
such changes to status tiers. Dreze and Nunes (2009) have recently addressed exactly this 
trade-off from a psychological point of view. They present evidence that the addition of a 
fourth tier to a traditional three tier loyalty program actually benefits the perceptions of status 
for members in the second tier. On the other hand Dreze and Nunes (2009) find no evidence 
that members in the top tier are being negatively impacted.  
 
Combining these insights with our findings we hence recommend to airline X take a bottom-
up approach when introducing a third elite tier. Airline X‟s FFP, just like any other large FFP 27 
 
 
or loyalty program with elite tier levels, has a very large base level membership. This large 
bottom or base membership naturally lends itself by the virtue of its size and heterogeneity of 
membership (i.e. large number of members across a wide range of accrued status points) to 
be  subdivided  into  two  or  more  independent  status  levels  (see  Figure  3).  This 
recommendation can in fact easily be generalised to any large FFPs and loyalty programs 
with elite tier level. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
A change in airline X‟s or any other large FFP structure as depicted above would effectively 
introduce a Super Elite membership tier, without actually changing the top tier of the FFP. 
On the other hand the current second tier (Silver) would become more valuable. Furthermore, 
achieving tier status for those members in the bottom tier would become more attainable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
FFPs  have  gained  much  popularity  since  American  Airlines  first  introduced  its  program 
almost thirty years ago. In spite of their vast application throughout the airline industry and 
many other industries little is known about whether FFPs truly change consumer behaviour, 
introduce  price  premiums  and  what  the  magnitude  of  such  a  premium  might  be.  Prior 
literature relies on publicly available data and the assumptions of exogenous factors (e.g. 
network effects) and specific market structures (competition/monopolistic) in order to show 
the existence of a FFP price premiums. Due to the detailed nature of our data we can show 
that no recourse to competition is necessary in order to have FFP fare premiums, but that the 
mere existence of an FFP leads to higher prices paid by FFP members. Although we have 
derived  the  expected  FFP  price  premiums  and  FFP  points  values  by  having  recourse  to 28 
 
 
simulations of hypothetical changes from one membership status to the next higher status, we 
nevertheless believe that our FFP price premium effect exists next to effects based on airline 
competition and other exogenous factors indicated in prior literature. The notable FFP price 
premium of 5-6% on an average airfare that we find is based on the intrinsic characteristic of 
the FFP structure itself, i.e. the variation in status tier levels. Hence our research indicates 
that it would make sense for airline X to introduce another tier level into its current FFP in 
order to further exploit the willingness-to-pay a fare premium by FFP members. We further 
derive the explicit monetary value per FFP point that FFP members are willing to pay. This 
value ranges between US$ 4c and US$ 6c, depending on the tier status of an FFP member. 
Our methodology can be used by airlines and loyalty programs with elite tier structures to 
estimate the average value of their points in accordance with IFRIC 13 regulation, enter into 
price negotiations with banks/credit card companies or as a blue print for the re-structure of 
their FFP to take better advantage of the behaviour changing incentives that FFPs provide 
them with.  
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 Table 1 FFP empirical literature: reported findings (in 2008 US$) 
Author (Year)  Data 
† 
 
Method*  Explanatory variable capturing FFP effect  Findings – average fare premiums 
and value of FFP point  
Morrison et al.  (1989)  RP 
 
MNL  Frequent flier mileage awarded times 
number of cities served by carrier 
30.15 i.e. 5.1 cents per FFP point 
Nako  (1992)  RP 
 
MNL  FFP membership and hub effect  30.05 i.e. 7.46% of average fare 
Morrison and Winston  
(1995) 
RP  MNL  Frequent flier mileage awarded times 
number of cities served by carrier 





MNL  Participation and active participation in FFP  39–54 i.e. 8-11% of average fare 
Hess, Adler, and Polak  
(2007) 





2SLS FE  Increase in the number of eligible partner 
flights by 1000 flights 
1.91 i.e. 0.32% of average fare 
Lederman (2008)  RP 
 
FE  Extension of dominant airline‟s FFP to 
include its partner‟s flights 
10 i.e. 3.8% of average fare 
†RP = Revealed Preference, SP=Stated Preference; *MNL = Multinomial Logit, 2SLS = Two-Stage Least Squares, FE = Fixed Effects 
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Table 2 Summary of categorical variables 
    Category  N  Percentage 
         
Flight variables          
Departure time    05:00 – 9:59  19834  32.6 
  10:00 – 13.59  10325  17.0 
  14:00 – 16.59  12296  20.2 
  17:00 – 20:59  17708  29.1 
  21:00 – 4:49  619  1.0 
         
Fare conditions    1  11439  18.8 
    2  40725  67.0 
    3  7129  11.7 
    4  1489  2.4 
         
Within 10% of next tier level    No  59475  97.8 
  Yes  1307  2.2 
         
Tier variables         
FFP member other airline    No  6557  49.9 
  Yes  6591  50.1 
         
FFP tier status other airline    Bronze  4141  31.5 
    Silver  1339  10.2 
    Gold  675  5.1 
    Platinum  436  3.3 
         
Tier    Bronze  11900  90.5 
  Silver  961  7.3 
  Gold  287  2.2 
         
Socio-economic variables         
Gender    male  7335  55.8 
  female  5813  44.2 
         
Job    Managers, administrators  3955  30.1 
  Professionals, associate professionals  2847  21.7 
  Tradespersons  945  7.2 
  Clerical, service workers  808  6.1 
  Self employed  754  5.7 
  Retiree, student, unemployed  1046  8.0 
    Other  2793  21.2 
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
    N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  
         
Flight variables         
Days booked in advance    60782  12.11  16.43 
         
Distance alt. 1    11439  516.84  204.69 
Distance alt. 2    40725  547.10  252.37 
Distance alt. 3    7129  514.18  226.41 
Distance alt. 4    1005  568.23  283.32 
Distance alt. 5    484  683.96  441.25 
         
Fare alt. 1     11439  68.21  13.96 
Fare alt. 2     40725  122.54  25.42 
Fare alt. 3     7129  227.48  41.71 
Fare alt. 4     1005  285.48  65.32 
Fare alt. 5     484  366.28  109.83 
         
Socio-economic variables         
Age    13148  42.22  13.34 
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Table 4 Estimation results, robust standard errors are given in brackets, bold are significant at the 5% level 
 
Variable      Panel Mixed Logit 
         
Alternative specific variables         
(Mean of) Fare      -0.0062  (0.0008) 
Std. dev. of Fare      0.0114  (0.0003) 
Fare*Silver      0.0034  (0.0013) 
Fare*Gold      0.0033  (0.0024) 
         
Fare conditions      1.8429  (0.0885) 
         
Alternative specific constants         
Constant alt. 1      0  n/a 
Constant alt. 2      0  n/a 
Constant alt. 3      0  n/a 
Constant alt. 4      -5.2075  (0.3109) 
Constant alt. 5      -8.5882  (0.5665) 
         
Tier airline X         
Silver tier level alt. 2      0.3815  (0.1076) 
Silver tier level alt. 3      0.9567  (0.3070 
Silver tier level alt. 4      0.8018  (0.4098) 
Silver tier level alt. 5      0.7731  (0.5349) 
Gold tier level alt. 2      0.4591  (0.1634) 
Gold tier level alt. 3      1.6781  (0.4288) 
Gold tier level alt. 4      1.6322  (0.5220) 
Gold tier level alt. 5      2.0856  (0.6977) 
Within 10% of next tier level, alt2      0.2385  (0.1136) 
Within 10% of next tier level, alt3      0.3921  (0.1489) 
Within 10% of next tier level, alt4      0.7495  (0.2213) 
Within 10% of next tier level, alt5      0.5390  (0.2622) 
         
Tier other airline         
FFP member other airline alt. 2      0.1882  (0.0376) 
FFP member other airline alt. 3      0.3627  (0.1070) 
FFP member other airline alt. 4      0.7532  (0.1754) 
FFP member other airline alt. 5      1.1671  (0.3065) 
Silver tier level other airline alt. 2      0.1989  (0.0628) 
Silver tier level other airline alt. 3      0.7609  (0.1708) 
Silver tier level other airline alt. 4      0.9898  (0.2787) 
Silver tier level other airline alt. 5      1.3433  (0.3543) 
Gold tier level other airline alt. 2      0.3464  (0.0922) 
Gold tier level other airline alt. 3      1.3221  (0.2509) 
Gold tier level other airline alt. 4      1.5147  (0.3149) 
Gold tier level other airline alt. 5      2.0286  (0.4374) 
Platinum tier level other airline alt. 2      0.4466  (0.1097) 
Platinum tier level other airline alt. 3      2.2038  (0.2533) 
Platinum tier level other airline alt. 4      2.3571  (0.3431) 
Platinum tier level other airline alt. 5      3.8232  (0.4501) 
         
Trip specific variables         
Days booked in advance alt. 2      -0.0330  (0.0013) 
Days booked in advance alt. 3      -0.0819  (0.0038) 
Days booked in advance alt. 4      -0.1037  (0.0087) 
Days booked in advance alt. 5      -0.0564  (0.0103) 
         
Job          
Managers, administrators alt. 2      0.0040  (0.0429) 
Managers, administrators alt. 3      -0.5544  (0.1153) 
Managers, administrators alt. 4      -0.5359  (0.1966) 
Managers, administrators alt. 5      -1.1348  (0.3055) 
         
(Associate) professionals alt. 2      0.3914  (0.0750) 
(Associate) professionals alt. 3      0.2471  (0.1846) 
(Associate) professionals alt. 4      0.3601  (0.2784) 
(Associate) professionals alt. 5      -0.2405  (0.3951) 
         
Tradepersons, related workers alt. 2      0.0993  (0.1156) 
Tradepersons, related workers alt. 3      -0.7530  (0.4201) 
Tradepersons, related workers alt. 4      -0.5151  (0.5671) 
Tradepersons, related workers alt. 5      -6.9820  (0.6572) 
         
Clerical, sales workers alt. 2      -0.1716  (0.0922) 


























   
Clerical, sales workers alt. 4      0.9457  (0.4577) 
Clerical, sales workers alt. 5      -1.4963  (0.8798) 
         
Self employed alt. 2      -0.0323  (0.0737) 
Self employed alt. 3      -1.1815  (0.2347) 
Self employed alt. 4      0.0072  (0.5137) 
Self employed alt. 5      0.5695  (0.5067) 
         
Retiree, student, unemployed alt. 2      -0.4409  (0.0688) 
Retiree, student, unemployed alt. 3      -3.4918  (0.3437) 
Retiree, student, unemployed alt. 4      -2.1986  (0.4982) 
Retiree, student, unemployed alt. 5      -1.9261  (0.6355) 
         
Other alt. 2      0  n/a 
Other alt. 3      0  n/a 
Other alt. 4      0  n/a 
Other alt. 5      0  n/a 
         
Variance error component         
Alt1 and Alt2      0.0245  (0.2734) 
Alt2 and Alt3      0.2157  (0.0844) 
Alt3 and Alt4      1.4680  (0.0602) 
Alt4 and Alt5      0.8653  (0.1839) 
         
Observations      60 782   
Initial Log Likelihood      -79 324   
Final Log Likelihood      -48 992   















Figure 1: FFP tier membership pyramid 
   
Top Membership Tier (~10% in most FFPs‟) 
Medium Membership Tier (~25-40% in most FFPs‟) 





Figure 2: The process of moving across FFP membership tier 

















Figure 3: Proposed structural change to airline X’s FFP  
   
Super Elite Membership Tier (~10%) at 50,000 Status Points 
Elite Membership Tier (~25%) at 20,000 Status Points 
NEW: Medium Membership Tier (~25%) at 10,000 Status Points 




                                                 
1 The FFP listing is published and regularly updated by Global Flight, a company focusing on 
the  needs  of  frequent  business  travellers.  For  more  information  on  Global  Flight,  see 
www.globalflight.net. 
2 The following quote represents generally held views amongst airline executives: “(…) there 
is a massive behavioural reaction around status miles and thresholds. Often accentuated by 
the airline actively raising the awareness for expiring miles or proximity of higher level.” (P. 
Baumgartner, CCO Etihad Airlines by email, April 8, 2010). 
3 "We didn't want a FFP. But it came to my attention that FFPs were siphoning business 
travel away (…) I think if we had not done that we would have been terribly disadvantaged."- 
H. Kelleher, Former President Southwest Airlines. See www.frequentflier.com/ffp-005.htm. 
4 Marketing research investigates how FFPs contribute to financial and market performance 
(e.g. Sharp and Sharp , 1997) and whether FFPs create customer loyalty, e.g.  Dowling and 
Uncles  (1997) state: “it is probably a mistake for a company to introduce a frequent-buyer 
program if it is selling a parity brand in a competitive market”. 
5 Assuming that each error term is independent with identically distributed extreme value 
(Gumbel and type I extreme value distributed), the standard logit probability that person  n 
















6 Data details are available upon request on a confidential basis upon signing a NDA. 
7 We distinguish between booking 0–7, 8–20, 20–60 and >60 days in advance, and flying 




                                                                                                                                                  
8 Reversed causality between the fare type choice and status level is not an issue here since 
the status level is based upon the aggregated past behaviour of the consumer and does not 
depend on the current fare type choice. 
9 The probabilities in both the base and scenario case(s) are simulated using hundred Halton 
draws, only taking into account the individuals who are facing a change of tier membership in 
the scenario. 